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Is Bayes Posterior just
Quick and Dirty Confidence?1
D. A. S. Fraser
Abstract. Bayes [Philos. Trans. R. Soc. Lond. 53 (1763) 370–418; 54
296–325] introduced the observed likelihood function to statistical in-
ference and provided a weight function to calibrate the parameter; he
also introduced a confidence distribution on the parameter space but
did not provide present justifications. Of course the names likelihood
and confidence did not appear until much later: Fisher [Philos. Trans.
R. Soc. Lond. Ser. A Math. Phys. Eng. Sci. 222 (1922) 309–368] for
likelihood and Neyman [Philos. Trans. R. Soc. Lond. Ser. A Math.
Phys. Eng. Sci. 237 (1937) 333–380] for confidence. Lindley [J. Roy.
Statist. Soc. Ser. B 20 (1958) 102–107] showed that the Bayes and
the confidence results were different when the model was not location.
This paper examines the occurrence of true statements from the Bayes
approach and from the confidence approach, and shows that the pro-
portion of true statements in the Bayes case depends critically on the
presence of linearity in the model; and with departure from this linear-
ity the Bayes approach can be a poor approximation and be seriously
misleading. Bayesian integration of weighted likelihood thus provides
a first-order linear approximation to confidence, but without linearity
can give substantially incorrect results.
Key words and phrases: Bayes, Bayes error rate, confidence, default
prior, evaluating a prior, nonlinear parameter, posterior, prior.
1. INTRODUCTION
Statistical inference based on the observed likeli-
hood function was initiated by Bayes (1763). This
was, however, without the naming of the likelihood
function or the apparent recognition that likelihood
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L0(θ) = f(y0; θ) directly records the amount of prob-
ability at an observed data point y0; such appeared
much later (Fisher, 1922).
Bayes’ proposal applies directly to a model with
translation invariance that in current notation would
be written f(y − θ); it recommended that a weight
function or mathematical prior pi(θ) be applied to
the likelihood L(θ), and that the product pi(θ)L(θ)
be treated as if it were a joint density for (θ, y). Then
with observed data y0 and the use of the conditional
probability lemma, a posterior distribution pi(θ|y) =
cpi(θ)L0(θ) was obtained; this was viewed as a de-
scription of possible values for θ in the presence of
data y = y0. For the location model, as examined by
the Bayes approach, translation invariance suggests
a constant or flat prior pi(θ) = c which leads to the
posterior distribution pi(θ|y0) = f(y0−θ) and, in the
scalar case, gives the posterior survival probability
s(θ) =
∫
∞
θ f(y
0 − α)dα, recording alleged probabil-
ity to the right of a value θ.
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The probability interpretation that would seem-
ingly attach to this conditional calculation is as fol-
lows: if the θ values that might have been present
in the application can be viewed as coming from the
frequency pattern pi(θ) with each θ value in turn giv-
ing rise to a y value in accord with the model and if
the resulting y values that are close to y0 are exam-
ined, then the associated θ values have the pattern
pi(θ|y0).
The complication is that pi(θ) as proposed is a ma-
thematical construct and, correspondingly, pi(θ|y0)
is just a mathematical construct. The argument us-
ing the conditional probability lemma does not pro-
duce probabilities from no probabilities: the prob-
ability lemma when invoked for an application has
two distributions as input and one distribution as
output; and it asserts the descriptive validity of the
output on the basis of the descriptive validity of the
two inputs; if one of the inputs is absent and an
artifact is substituted, then the lemma says noth-
ing, and produces no probabilities. Of course, other
lemmas and other theory may offer something ap-
propriate.
We will see, however, that something different is
readily available and indeed available without the
special translation invariance. We will also see that
the procedure of augmenting likelihood L0(θ) with
a modulating factor that expresses model structure
is a powerful first step in exploring information con-
tained in Fisher’s likelihood function.
An alternative to the Bayes proposal was intro-
duced by Fisher (1930) as a confidence distribution.
For the scalar-parameter case we can record the per-
centage position of the data point y0 in the distri-
bution having parameter value θ,
p(θ) = p(θ;y0) =
∫ y0
−∞
f(y− θ)dy.
This records the proportion of the θ population that
is less than the value y0. For a general data point y
we have of course that p(θ;y) is uniformly distributed
on (0,1), and, correspondingly, p(θ) from the data y0
gives the upper-tail distribution function or survivor
function for confidence, as introduced by Fisher
(1935). A basic way of presenting confidence is in
terms of quantiles. If we set p(θ) = 0.95 and solve
for θ, we obtain θ = θˆ0.95 which is the value with
right tail confidence 95% and left tail confidence
5%; this would typically be called the 95% lower
confidence bound, and (θˆ0.95,∞) would be the cor-
responding 95% confidence interval.
For two-sided confidence the situation has some
subtleties that are often overlooked. With the large
data sets that have come from the colliders of High
Energy Physics, a Poisson count can have a mean
at a background count level or at a larger value if
some proposed particle is actually present. A com-
mon practice in the High Energy Physics literature
(Mandelkern, 2002) has been to form two-sided con-
fidence intervals and to allow the confidence con-
tributions in the two tails to be different, thereby
accommodating some optimality criterion; see also
some discussion in Section 4. In practice, this meant
that the confidence lower bound shied away from
the critical parameter lower bound describing just
the background radiation. This mismanaged the de-
tection of a new particle. Accordingly, our view is
that two-sided intervals should typically have equal
or certainly designated amounts of confidence in the
two tails. With this in mind, we now restrict the dis-
cussion to the analysis of the confidence bounds as
described in the preceding paragraph and view con-
fidence intervals as being properly built on individ-
ual confidence bounds with designated confidence
values.
As a simple example consider the Normal(µ,σ20),
and let φ(z) and Φ(z) be the standard normal den-
sity and distribution functions. The p-value from
data y0 is
p(µ) =
∫ y0
−∞
φ
(
y − µ
σ0
)
dy =Φ
(
y0 − µ
σ0
)
,
which has normal distribution function shape drop-
ping from 1 at −∞ to 0 at +∞; it records the proba-
bility position of the data with respect to a possible
parameter value µ; see Figure 1(a). From the con-
fidence viewpoint, p(µ) is recording the right tail
confidence distribution function, and the confidence
distribution is Normal(y0, σ20).
The Bayes posterior distribution for µ using the
invariant prior has density cφ{(y0 − µ)/σ0}; this is
Normal(y0, σ20). The resulting posterior survivor fun-
ction value is
s(µ) =
∫
∞
µ
φ
(
y0 − α
σ0
)
dα=Φ
(
y0 − µ
σ0
)
and its values are indicated in Figure 1(b); the func-
tion provides a probability-type evaluation of the
right tail interval (µ,∞) for the parameter. For this
we have used the letter s to suggest the “survivor”
aspect of the Bayes analogue of the present one-
sided frequentist p-value.
3(a)
(b)
Fig. 1. Normal(µ,1) model: The density of y given µ in (a);
the posterior density of µ given y0 in (b). The p-value p(µ)
from (a) is equal to the survivor value s(µ) in (b).
For a second example consider the model y = θ+ z,
where z has the standard extreme value distribution
with density g(z) = e−z exp{−e−z} and distribution
function G(z) = exp(−e−z). The p-value from data y0
is
p(θ) =
∫ y0
−∞
g(y − θ)dy =G(y0 − θ)
= exp{−e−(y
0
−θ)},
which records the probability position of the data
in the θ distribution; it can be viewed as a right
tail distribution function for confidence. The pos-
terior distribution for θ using the Bayes invariant
prior has density g(y0 − θ) and can be described as
a reversed extreme value distribution centered at y0.
The posterior survivor function is
s(θ) =
∫
∞
θ
g(y0 −α)dα= exp{−e−(y
0
−θ)},
and again agrees with the p-value p(θ); see Figure 2.
Of course, in general for a location model f(y− θ)
as examined by Bayes, we have
p(θ) =
∫ y0
−∞
f(y− θ)dy =
∫ y0−θ
−∞
f(z)dz
=
∫
∞
θ
f(y0 −α)dα= s(θ),
and, thus, the Bayes posterior distribution is equal
to the confidence distribution. Or, more directly, the
Bayes posterior distribution is just standard confi-
dence.
(a)
(b)
Fig. 2. The extreme value EV(θ,1) model: the density of y
given θ in (a); the posterior density of θ given y0 in (b). The
p-value p(θ) from (a) is equal to the survivor value s(θ) in (b).
Lindley (1958) presented this result and under
suitable change of variable and parameter showed
more: that the p-value and s-value are equal if and
only if the model f(y; θ) is a location model f(y−θ).
In his perspective then, this argued that the confi-
dence approach was flawed, confidence as obtained
by inverting the p-value function as a pivot. From
a different perspective, however, it argues equally
that the Bayes approach is flawed, and does not have
the support of the confidence interpretation unless
the model is location.
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Lindley objected also to the term probability be-
ing attached to the original Fisher word for con-
fidence, viewing probability as appropriate only in
reference to the conditional type calculations used
by Bayes. By contrast, repetition properties for con-
fidence had been clarified by Neyman (1937). As
a consequence, in the discipline of statistics, the
terms probability and distribution were then typi-
cally not used in the confidence context, but were in
the Bayes context. The repetition properties, how-
ever, do not extend to the Bayes calculation ex-
cept for simple location cases, as we will see; but
they do extend for the confidence inversion. We take
this as strong argument that the term probability
is less appropriate in the Bayesian weighted likeli-
hood context than in the confidence inversion con-
text.
The location model, however, is extremely spe-
cial in that the parameter has a fundamental lin-
earity and this linearity is expressed in the use of
the flat prior with respect to the location param-
eter. Many extensions of the Bayes mathematical
prior have been proposed trying to achieve the fa-
vorable behavior of the original Bayes, for example,
Jeffreys (1939, 1946) and Bernardo (1979). We refer
to such priors as default priors, priors to elicit infor-
mation from an observed likelihood function. And
we will show that if the parameter departs from
a basic linearity, then the Bayes posterior can be
seriously misleading. Specifically, we will show that
with moderate departures from linearity the Bayes
calculation can give an acceptable approximation to
confidence, but that with more extreme departure
from linearity or with large parameter dimension it
can give unacceptable approximations.
John Tukey actively promoted a wealth of simple
statistical methods as a means to explore data; he
referred to them as quick and dirty methods. They
were certainly quick using medians and ranges and
other easily accessible characteristics of data. And
they were dirty in the sense of ignoring character-
istics that in the then currently correct view were
considered important. We argue that Bayes poste-
rior calculations can appropriately be called quick
and dirty, quick and dirty confidence.
There are also extensions of the Bayes approach
allowing the prior to reflect the viewpoint or judg-
ment or prejudice of an investigator; or to reflect
the elicited considerations of those familiar with the
context being investigated. Arguments have been
given that such a viewpoint or consideration can be
expressed as probability; but the examples that we
present suggest otherwise.
There are of course contexts where the true value of
the parameter has come from a source with a known
distribution; in such cases the prior is real, it is ob-
jective, and could reasonably be considered to be
a part of an enlarged model. Then whether to in-
clude the prior becomes a modeling issue. Also, in
particular contexts, there may be legal, ethical or
moral issues as to whether such outside information
can be included. If included, the enlarged model is
a probability model and accordingly is not statisti-
cal: as such, it has no statistical parameters in the
technical sense and thus predates Bayes and can be
viewed as being probability itself not Bayesian. Why
this would commonly be included in the Bayesian
domain is not clear; it is not indicated in the orig-
inal Bayes, although it was an area neglected by
the frequentist approach. Such a prior describing
a known source is clearly objective and can properly
be called an objective prior; this conflicts, however,
with some recent Bayesian usage where the term ob-
jective is misapplied and refers to the mathematical
priors that we are calling default priors.
In Section 2 we consider the scalar variable scalar
parameter case and determine the default prior that
gives posteriors with reliable quantiles; some details
for the vector parameter case are also discussed. In
Section 3 we argue that the only satisfactory way
to assess distributions for unobserved quantities is
by means of the quantiles of such distributions; this
provides the basis then for comparing the Bayesian
and frequentist approaches.
In Sections 4–6 we explore a succession of exam-
ples that examine how curvature in the model or
in the parameter of interest can destroy any confi-
dence reliability in the default Bayes approach, and
thus in the Bayesian use of just likelihood to present
a distribution purporting to describe an unknown
parameter value.
In Sections 7 and 8 we discuss the merits of the
conditional probability formula when used with a ma-
thematical prior and also the merits of the optimal-
ity approach; then Section 9 records a brief discus-
sion and Section 10 a summary.
2. BUT IF THE MODEL IS NONLINEAR
With a location model the confidence approach
gives p(θ) and the default Bayes approach gives s(θ),
and these are equal. Now consider things more gen-
erally and initially examine just a statistical mo-
5del f(y; θ) where both y and θ are scalar or real
valued as opposed to vector valued, but without the
assumed linear relationship just discussed.
Confidence is obtained from the observed distribu-
tion function F 0(θ) and a posterior is obtained from
the observed density function f0(θ). For convenience
we assume minimum continuity and that F (y; θ) is
stochastically increasing and attains both 0 and 1
under variation in y or θ. The confidence p-value is
directly the observed distribution function,
p(θ) = F 0(θ) = F (y0; θ),
which can be rewritten mechanically as
p(θ) =
∫
∞
θ
−F;θ(y
0;α)dα;
the subscript denotes partial differentiation with re-
spect to the corresponding argument. The default
Bayes s-value is obtained from likelihood, which is
the observed density function f(y0; θ) = Fy(y
0; θ):
s(θ) =
∫
∞
θ
pi(α)Fy(y
0;α)dα.
If p(θ) and s(θ) are in agreement, then the direct
comparison of the integrals implies that
pi(θ) =
−F;θ(y
0; θ)
Fy(y0; θ)
.
This presents pi(θ) as a possibly data-dependent
prior. Of course, data dependent priors have a long
but rather infrequent presence, for example, Box
and Cox (1964), Wasserman (2000) and Fraser et
al. (2010b). The preceding expression for the prior
can be rewritten as
pi(θ) =
dy
dθ
∣∣∣∣
y0
by directly differentiating the quantile function y =
y(u, θ) for fixed p-value to u = F (y; θ) and taking
the observed value, or by taking the total differen-
tial of F (y; θ); Lindley’s (1958) result follows by not-
ing that the differential equation dy/dθ = a(θ)/b(y)
integrates to give a location model.
Now suppose we go beyond the simple case of the
scalar model and allow that y is a vector of length n
and θ is a vector of length p. In many applications
n > p; but here we assume that dim y has been re-
duced to p by conditioning (see, e.g., Fraser, Fraser
and Staicu, 2010c), and that a smooth pivot z(y, θ)
with density g(z) describes how the parameter af-
fects the distribution of the variable. The density
for y is available by inverting from pivot to sample
space:
g(z)dz = f(y; θ)dy= g{z(y; θ)}|zy(y; θ)|dy,
where the subscript again denotes partial differenti-
ation.
For confidence a differential element is obtained
by inverting from pivot to parameter space:
g(z)dz = g{z(y0; θ)}|z;θ(y
0; θ)|dθ.
And for posterior probability the differential element
is obtained as weighted likelihood
g(z)dz = g{z(y0; θ)}|zy(y
0; θ)|pi(θ)dθ.
The confidence and posterior differential elements
are equal if
pi(θ) =
|z;θ(y
0; θ)|
|zy(y0; θ)|
;
we call this the default prior for the model f(y; θ)
with data y0. As dy/dθ = z−1y (y
0; θ)z;θ(y
0; θ) for fi-
xed z, we will have confidence equal to posterior
if pi(θ) = |dy/dθ|y0 , a simple extension of the scalar
case. The matrix dy/dθ|y0 can be called the sensi-
tivity of the parameter at the data point y0 and the
determinant provides a natural weighting or scal-
ing function pi(θ) for the parameter; this sensitiv-
ity is just presenting how parameter change affects
the model and is recording this just at the relevant
point, the observed data.
3. HOW TO EVALUATE A POSTERIOR
DISTRIBUTION
(i) Distribution function or quantile function. In
the scalar parameter case, both p(θ) and s(θ) have
the form of a right tail distribution function or sur-
vivor function. In the Bayesian framework, the func-
tion s(θ) is viewed as a distribution of posterior
probability. In the frequentist framework, the func-
tion p(θ) can be viewed as a distribution of confi-
dence, as introduced by Fisher (1930) but originally
called fiducial; it has long been a familiar theme, fre-
quentist or Bayesian, that it is inappropriate to treat
such a function as a distribution describing possible
values for the true parameter.
For a scalar parameter model with data, the Bayes
and the confidence approaches with data each lead
to a probability-type evaluation on the parameter
space; and these can be different as Lindley (1958)
demonstrated and as we have quantified in the pre-
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ceding section. Surely then, they both cannot be cor-
rect. So, how to evaluate such posterior distributions
for the parameter?
A probability description is a rather complex thing
even for a scalar parameter: ascribing a probability-
type assessment to one-sided intervals, two-sided in-
tervals, and more general sets. What seems more
tangible but, indeed, is equivalent is to focus on the
reverse, the quantiles: choose an amount β of prob-
ability and then determine the corresponding quan-
tile θˆβ , a value with the alleged probability 1 − β
to the left and with β to the right. We then have
that a particular interval (θˆβ,∞) from the data has
the alleged amount β. Here we focus on such quan-
tiles θˆβ on the scale for θ. In particular, we might
examine the 95% quantile θˆ0.95, the median quan-
tile θˆ0.50, the 5% quantile θˆ0.05, and others, all as
part of examining an alleged distribution for θ ob-
tained from the data.
For the Normal(µ,σ20) example with data y
0, the
confidence approach gives the β-level quantile
µˆβ = y
0 − zβσ0,
where Φ(zβ) = β as based on the standard normal
distribution function Φ. In particular, the 95%,50%
and 5% quantiles are
µˆ0.95 = y
0 − 1.64σ0, µˆ0.50 = y
0,
µˆ0.05 = y
0 +1.64σ0;
and the corresponding confidence intervals are
(y0 − 1.64σ0,∞), (y
0,∞), (y0 +1.64σ0,∞),
with the lower confidence bound in each case record-
ing the corresponding quantile.
Now more generally suppose we have a model f(y;
θ) and data y0, and that we want to evaluate a pro-
posed procedure, Bayes, frequentist or other, that gi-
ves a probability-type evaluation of where the true
parameter θ might be. As just discussed, we can fo-
cus on some level, say, β, and then examine the cor-
responding quantile θˆβ or the related interval (θˆβ,∞).
In any particular instance, either the true θ is in the
interval (θˆβ,∞), or it is not. And yet the procedure
has put forward a numerical level β for the pres-
ence of θ in (θˆβ,∞). What does the asserted level β
mean?
(ii) Evaluating a proposed quantile. The definitive
evaluation procedure is in the literature: use a Ney-
man (1937) diagram. The model f(y; θ) sits on the
space S × Ω which here is the real line for S cross
the real line for Ω; this is just the plane R2. For
any particular y the procedure gives a parameter
interval (θˆβ(y),∞); if we then assemble the result-
Fig. 3. The 97.5% allegation for the Normal confidence pro-
cedure, on the (y, θ)-space.
ing intervals, we obtain a region
Aβ =
⋃
{y} × (θˆ(y),∞) = {(y, θ) : θ in (θˆ(y),∞)}
on the plane. For the confidence procedure in the
simple Normal(θ,1) case, Figure 3 illustrates the
97.5% quantile θˆ0.975 for that confidence procedure;
the region Aβ = A0.975 is to the upper left of the
angled line and it represents the β = 97.5% allega-
tion concerning the true θ, as proceeding from the
confidence procedure.
Now, more generally for a scalar parameter, we
suggest that the sets Aβ present precisely the essence
of a posterior procedure: how the procedure presents
information concerning the unknown θ value. We
can certainly examine these for various values of β
and thus investigate the merits of any claim implicit
in the alleged levels β.
The level β is attached to the claim that θ is
in (θˆβ(y),∞), or, equivalently, that (y, θ) is in the
set Aβ . In any particular instance, there is of course
a true value θ, and either it is in {θˆβ(y),∞} or it
is not in {θˆβ(y),∞}. And the true θ did precede
the generation of the observed y in full accord with
the probabilities given by the model. Accordingly,
a value θ for the parameter in the model implies an
actual Proportion of true assertions consequent to
that θ value:
Propn(Aβ; θ) = Pr{Aβ includes (y, θ); θ}.
This allows us to check what relationship the ac-
tual Proportion bears to the value β asserted by the
procedure: is it really β or is it something else?
7Of course, there may be contexts where in addi-
tion we have that the θ value has been generated
by some random source described by an available
prior density pi(θ), and we would be interested in
the associated Proportion,
Propn(Aβ ;pi) =
∫
Propn(Aβ ; θ)pi(θ)dθ,
presenting the average relative to the source densi-
ty pi(θ).
(iii) Comparing proposed quantiles. For the Bayes
procedure with the special original linear model
f(y− θ) we have by the usual calculations that
Propn(Aβ ; θ)≡ β
for all θ and β: the alleged level β agrees with the
actual Proportion of true assertions that are made.
And, more generally, if the θ value has been gener-
ated by a source pi(θ), then it follows that the alleged
level β does agree with the actual Proportion: thus,
Propn(Aβ;pi)≡ β.
For the standard confidence procedure in the con-
text of an arbitrary continuous scalar model f(y; θ),
we have by the standard calculations that
Propn(Aβ ; θ)≡ Pr{(y, θ) in Aβ; θ}
≡ Pr{F (y; θ)≤ β; θ} ≡ β
for all θ and β. Of course, in the special Bayes loca-
tion model f(y − θ) the Bayes original procedure
does coincide with the confidence procedure: the
original Bayes was confidence in disguise.
Now for some proposed procedure having a re-
gion Aβ with alleged level β, there is of course the
possibility that the actual Proportion is less than β
for some θ and is greater than β for some other θ and
yet when averaged with a particular prior pi(θ) gives
a revised Propn(Aβ;pi) that does have the value β;
the importance or otherwise of this we will discuss
later.
But we now ask, what is the actual Proportion
for a Bayes procedure in nonlocation models? To-
ward this, we next examine a succession of exam-
ples where the linearity is absent to varying degrees,
where the parameter to variable relationship is non-
linear!
4. NONLINEARITY AND BOUNDED
PARAMETER: THE ERRORS ARE O(1)
We first examine an extreme form of nonlinear-
ity, where the range of the parameter is bounded.
This is a familiar problem in the current High En-
ergy Physics of particle accelerators and the related
search and detection of possible new particles: a par-
ticle count has a Poisson(θ) distribution but θ is
bounded below by θ0, which represents the contri-
bution from background radiation. For some discus-
sion see Mandelkern (2002), Reid and Fraser (2003)
and Fraser, Reid and Wong (2004).
The critical issues are more easily examined in
a continuous context. For this, suppose that y is
Normal(θ,σ20) and that it is known that θ ≥ θ0 with
an interest in detecting whether θ is actually larger
than θ0; let y
0 be the observed data point; this con-
tinuous version was also mentioned in Mandelkern
(2002), Woodroofe and Wang (2000) and Zhang and
Woodroofe (2003). For convenience here and with-
out loss of generality, we take the known σ0 = 1 and
the lower bound θ0 = 0.
From a frequentist viewpoint, there is the likeli-
hood
L0(θ) = cφ(y0 − θ)
recording probability at the data, again using φ(z)
for the standard normal density. And also there is
the p-value
p(θ) = Φ(y0 − θ)
recording probability left of the data. They each of-
fer a basic presentation of information concerning
the parameter value θ; see Figure 4(a) and (b). Also
note that p(θ) does not reach the value 1 at the lower
limit θ0 for θ; of course, the p-value is just recording
the statistical position of the data y0 under possi-
ble θ values, so there is no reason to want or expect
such a limit.
First consider the confidence approach. The in-
terval (0, β) for the p-value function gives the inter-
val {max(θ0, y
0 − zβ),∞} for θ when we acknowl-
edge the lower bound, or gives the interval (y0 −
zβ,∞) when we ignore the lower bound. In either
case the actual Proportion is equal to the alleged
value β, regardless of the true value of θ. There
might perhaps be mild discomfort that if we ignore
the lower bound and calculate the interval, then
it can include parameter values that are not part
of the problem; but nonetheless the alleged level is
valid.
Now consider the default Bayes approach. The
model f(y; θ) = φ(y0− θ) is translation invariant for
θ ≥ θ0, and this would indicate the constant prior
pi(θ) = c, at least for θ ≥ θ0. Combining the prior
and likelihood and norming as usual gives the pos-
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(a)
(b)
(c)
Fig. 4. The Normal(θ,1) with θ ≥ θ0 = 0: (a) the likeli-
hood function L(θ); (b) p-value function p(θ) = Φ(y0 − θ);
(c) s-value function s(θ) = Φ(y0 − θ)/Φ(y0).
terior density
pi(θ|y0) =
φ(y0 − θ)
Φ(y0)
, θ ≥ 0,
and then gives the posterior survivor value
s(θ) =
Φ(y0 − θ)
Φ(y0)
, θ ≥ 0.
See Figure 4(c). The β-quantile of this truncated
normal distribution for θ is obtained by setting
s(θ) = β and solving for θ:
θˆβ = y
0 − zβΦ(y0),
Fig. 5. Normal with bounded mean: the actual Proportion
for the claimed level β = 50% is strictly less than the claimed
50%.
where again zγ designates the standard normal γ-
quantile.
We are now in a position to calculate the actual
Proportion, namely, the proportion of cases where
it is true that θ is in the quantile interval, or, equiv-
alently, the proportion of cases where (θˆβ,∞) in-
cludes the true θ value:
Propn(θ) = Pr{y− zβΦ(y) < θ : θ}
= Pr{z < zβΦ(θ+z)},
where z is taken as being Normal(0,1); this expres-
sion can be written as in integral
∫
S φ(z)dz with
S = {z :Φ(z)< βΦ(θ+z)} and can routinely be eval-
uated numerically for particular values of θ and β. In
particular, for θ at the lower limit θ = θ0 = 0 the cov-
erage set S becomes S = {z :Φ(z)< βΦ(z)}, which is
clearly the empty set unless β = 1. In particular, at
the lower limit θ = θ0 = 0 the Propn(θ0) has the phe-
nomenal value zero, Propn(θ0) = 0, which is a conse-
quence of the empty set just mentioned; certainly an
unusual performance property for a claimed Bayes
coverage of, say, β when, as typical, β is not zero.
In Figure 5 we plot this Proportion against β for
the β = 50% quantile; and we note that it is uni-
formly less than the nominal, the claimed 50%. In
particular, at the lower limit θ = θ0 = 0 the
Propn(θ0) = 0 has the phenomenal value zero, as
mentioned in the preceding paragraph; certainly an
unusual performance property for a claimed Bayes
coverage of β = 50%! Then in Figure 6 we plot the
9Fig. 6. Normal with bounded mean: the actual Proportions
for the claimed level β = 90% and β = 10% are strictly less
than the claimed.
proportion for β = 90% and for β = 10%; again we
note that the actual Proportion is uniformly less
than the claimed value, and again Propn(θ) has the
extraordinary coverage value 0 when the parameter
is at the lower bound 0. Of course, the departure
would be in the other direction in the case of an
upper bound.
In summary, in a context with a bound on the
parameter, the performance error with the Bayes
calculation can be of asymptotic order O(1).
5. NONLINEARITY AND PARAMETER
CURVATURE: THE ERRORS ARE O(n−1/2)
A bound on a parameter as just discussed is a ra-
ther extreme form of nonlinearity. Now consider a ve-
ry direct and common form of curvature. Let (y1, y2)
be Normal(θ; I) on R2 and consider the quadratic in-
terest parameter (θ21 + θ
2
2), or the equivalent ρ(θ) =
(θ21 + θ
2
2)
1/2
which has the same dimensional units as
the θi; and let y
0 = (y01 , y
0
2) be the observed data. For
asymptotic analysis we would view the present vari-
ables as being derived from some antecedent sample
of size n and they would then have the Normal(θ, I/
n) distribution.
From the frequentist view there is an observable
variable r= (y21 + y
2
2)
1/2 that in some pure physical
sense measures the parameter ρ. It has a noncentral
chi distribution with noncentrality ρ and degrees of
freedom 2. For convenience we let χ2(ρ) designate
such a variable with distribution function H2(χ,ρ),
which is typically available in computer packages;
and its square can be expressed as χ22 = (z1+ρ)
2+z22
in terms of standard normal variables and it has the
noncentral chi-square distribution with 2 degrees of
freedom and noncentrality usually described by ρ2.
The distribution of r is free of the nuisance param-
eter which can conveniently be taken as the polar
angle α= arctan(θ2/θ1). The resulting p-value func-
tion for ρ is
p(ρ) = Pr{χ2(ρ)≤ r
0}=H2(r
0;ρ).(1)
See Figure 7(a), where for illustration we examined
the behavior for θ = y0 +1.
From the frequentist view there is the directly
measured p-value p(ρ) with a Uniform(0,1) distri-
bution, and any β level lower confidence quantile is
available immediately by solving β =H2(r
0;ρ) for ρ
in terms of r0.
From the Bayes view there is a uniform prior
pi(θ) = c as directly indicated by Bayes (1763) for
a location model on the plane R2. The correspond-
ing posterior distribution for θ is then Normal(y0; I)
on the plane. And the resulting marginal posterior
for ρ is described by the generic variable χ2(r
0). As r
is stochastically increasing in ρ, we have that the
Bayes analog of the p-value is the posterior survivor
value obtained by an upper tail integration
s(ρ) = Pr{χ2(r
0)≥ ρ}= 1−H2(ρ; r
0).(2)
The Bayes s(ρ) and the frequentist p(ρ) are actu-
ally quite different, a direct consequence of the obvi-
ous curvature in the parameter ρ= (θ21+θ
2
2)
1/2. The
presence of the difference is easily assessed visually
in Figure 7 by noting that in either case there is a ro-
tationally symmetric normal distribution with unit
standard deviation which is at the distance d = 1
from the curved boundary used for the probabil-
ity calculations, but the curved boundary is cupped
away from the Normal distribution in the frequentist
case and is cupped toward the Normal distribution
in the Bayes case; this difference is the direct source
of the Bayes error.
From (1) and (2) we can evaluate the posterior
error s(ρ)− p(ρ) = 1−H2(ρ; r
0)−H2(r
0;ρ) which is
plotted against ρ in Figure 8 for r0 = 5. This Bayes
error here is always greater than zero. This happens
widely with a parameter that has curvature, with
the error in one or other direction depending on the
curvature being positive or negative relative to in-
creasing values of the parameter. Some aspects of
this discrepancy are discussed in David, Stone and
Zidek (1973) as a marginalization paradox.
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(a)
(b)
Fig. 7. (a) The model is N(θ; I); region for p(θ) is shown. (b) The posterior distribution for θ is N(y0; I); region for s(θ)
is shown.
Now in more detail for this example, consider the β
lower quantile ρˆβ of the Bayes posterior distribution
for the interest parameter ρ. This β quantile for the
parameter ρ is obtained from the χ2(r
0) posterior
distribution for ρ giving
ρˆβ = χ1−β(r
0),
where we now use χγ(r) for the γ quantile of the
noncentral chi variable with 2 degrees of freedom
and noncentrality r, that is, H2(χγ ; r) = γ. We are
now in a position to evaluate the Bayes posterior
proposal for ρ. For this let Propn(Aβ; θ) be the pro-
portion of true assertions that ρ is in Aβ={ρˆβ(r),∞};
we have
Propn(Aβ ;ρ) = Pr{ρ in (ρˆβ(r),∞);ρ}
=Pr{ρˆβ(r)≤ ρ;ρ}
=Pr{χ1−β(r)≤ ρ;ρ},
where the quantile ρˆβ(r) is seen to be the (1 − β)
point of a noncentral chi variable with degrees of
freedom 2 and noncentrality r, and the noncentral-
ity r has a noncentral chi distribution with noncen-
trality ρ. The actual Proportion under a parameter
value ρ can thus be presented as
Propn(Aβ ;ρ) = Pr[χ1−β{χ2(ρ)} ≤ ρ;ρ]
= Pr[1− β <H2{ρ;χ2(ρ)}],
which is available by numerical integration on the
real line for any chosen β value.
We plot the actual Propn(A50%;ρ) against ρ in
Figure 9 and note that it is always less than the al-
leged 50%. We then plot the Proportion for β = 90%
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Fig. 8. The Bayes error s(ρ)− p(ρ) from the N(θ, I) model with data y0 = (5,0).
Fig. 9. Proportion with claimed level β = 50%.
and for β = 10% in Figure 10 against ρ, and note
again that the plots are always less than the claimed
values 95% and 5%. This happens generally for all
possible quantile levels β, that the actual Propor-
tion is less than the alleged probability. It happens
for any chosen value for the parameter; and it hap-
pens for any prior average of such θ values. If by
contrast the center of curvature is to the right, then
the actual Proportion is reversed and is larger than
the alleged.
In summary, in the vector parameter context with
a curved interest parameter the performance error
with the Bayes calculation can be of asymptotic or-
der O(n−1/2).
Fig. 10. Proportion for claimed β = 90% and for claimed
β = 10%: strictly less than the claimed.
6. NONLINEARITY AND MODEL
CURVATURE: THE ERRORS ARE O(n−1)
(i) The model and confidence bound. Taylor series
expansions provide a powerful means for examining
the large sample form of a statistical model (see,
e.g., Abebe et al., 1995; Andrews, Fraser and Wong,
2005; Cakmak et al., 1998). From such expansions
we find that an asymptotic model to second order
can be expressed as a location model and to third
order can be expressed as a location model with an
O(n−1) adjustment that describes curvature.
Examples arise frequently in the vector parame-
ter context. But for the scalar parameter context
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Fig. 11. The 97.5% confidence quantile θˆC(y) = y −
1.96{1 + γ(y − 1.96)2/4n}. The 97.5% likelihood quantile
θˆL(y) = (1 + γ
2n
)[y − 1.96{1 + γ(y − 1.96)2/4n}] is a verti-
cal rescaling about the origin; the 97.5% Bayes quantile θˆB(y)
with prior exp{a/n+ cθ/n} is a vertical rescaling plus a lift
a/n and a tilt cy/n. Can this prior lead to a confidence pre-
sentation? No, unless the prior depends on the data or on the
level β.
the common familiar models are location or scale
models and thus without the curvature of interest
here. A simple example with curvature, however,
is the gamma distribution model: f(y; θ) =
Γ−1(θ)yθ−1 exp{−y}.
To illustrate the moderate curvature, we will take
a very simple example where y is Normal{θ,σ2(θ)}
and σ2(θ) depends just weakly on the mean θ, and
then in asymptotic standardized form we would have
σ2(θ) = 1+ γθ2/2n
in moderate deviations. The β-level quantile for this
normal variable y is
yβ(θ) = θ+ σ(θ)zβ
= θ+ zβ(1 + γθ
2/2n)1/2(3)
= θ+ zβ(1 + γθ
2/4n) +O(n−3/2).
The confidence bound θˆβ with β confidence above
can be obtained from the usual Fisher inversion of
y = θ+ zβ(1 + γθ
2/4n): we obtain
θ = y− zβ(1 + γθ
2/4n) +O(n−3/2)
= y− zβ{1 + γ(y − zβ)
2/4n}+O(n−3/2).
Thus, the β level lower confidence quantile to order
O(n−3/2) is
θˆC(y) = y − zβ{1 + γ(y − zβ)
2/4n},(4)
where we add the label C for confidence to distin-
guish it from other bounds soon to be calculated.
See Figure 11.
(ii) From confidence to likelihood. We are inter-
ested in examining posterior quantiles for the ad-
justed normal model and in this section work from
the confidence quantile to the likelihood quantile,
that is, to the posterior quantile with flat prior
pi(θ) = 1; this route seems computationally easier
than directly calculating a likelihood integral.
From Section 3 and formula (3) above, we have
that the prior pi(θ) that converts a likelihood fL(θ) =
L(θ;y0)=Fy(y
0; θ) to confidence fC(θ)=−F;θ(y
0; θ)
is
dy
dθ
∣∣∣∣
y0
= 1+ γzθ/2n|y0
= 1+ γ(y0 − θ)θ/2n+O(n−3/2)
= exp{γ(y0 − θ)θ/2n}+O(n−3/2).
Then to convert in the reverse direction, from confi-
dence fC(θ) to likelihood fL(θ), we need the inverse
weight function
w(θ) = exp{γθ(θ− y0)/2n}.(5)
Interestingly, this function is equal to 1 at θ = 0 and
at y0, and is less than 1 between these points when
γ > 0.
(iii) From confidence quantile to likelihood quan-
tile. The weight function (5) that converts confi-
dence to likelihood has the form exp{aθ/n1/2+ cθ2/
2n} with a = −γy0/2n1/2 and c = γ. The effect of
such a tilt and bending is recorded in the Appendix.
The confidence quantile θˆCβ given at (4) is a 1 − β
quantile of the confidence distribution. Then using
formula (10) in the Appendix, we obtain the for-
mula for converting confidence quantile to likelihood
quantile:
θˆL = θˆC
(
1 +
γ
2n
)
− γy0/2n+ γy0/2n
(6)
= θˆC
(
1 +
γ
2n
)
.
Thus, the likelihood distribution is obtained from
the confidence distribution by a simple scale factor
1 + γ/2n; this directly records the consequence of
the curvature added to the simple normal model by
having σ2(θ) depend weakly on θ.
(iv) From likelihood quantile to posterior quan-
tile. Now consider a prior applied to the likelihood
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Fig. 12. β-level quantiles. The difference θˆB(y) − θˆC(y) is the vertical separation above y between quantile curves. The
difference yC(θ)− yB(θ) is the horizontal separation between curves as a function of θ.
distribution. A prior can be expanded in terms of
standardized coordinates and takes the form pi(θ) =
exp(aθ/n1/2 + cθ2/2n). The effect on quantiles is
available from the Appendix and we see that a prior
with tilt coefficient a/n1/2 would excessively dis-
place the quantile and thus would give posterior
quantiles with bad behaving Propn(θ) in repetitions;
accordingly, as a possible prior adjustment, we con-
sider a tilt with just a coefficient a/n. We then ex-
amine the prior pi(θ) = exp(aθ/n + cθ2/2n). First,
we obtain the Bayes quantile in terms of the likeli-
hood quantile as
θˆB = θˆL
(
1 +
c
2n
)
+
a
n
+
cy
2n
;
and then substituting for the likelihood quantile in
terms of the confidence quantile (6) gives
θˆB = θˆC
(
1 +
γ + c
2n
)
+
a
n
+
cy
2n
.(7)
For θˆB(y) in (4) to be equal to θˆC(y) in (7) we would
need to have c = −γ and then a = γy/2. But this
would give a data dependent prior. We noted the
need for data dependent priors in Section 3, but we
now have an explicit expression for the effect of pri-
ors on quantiles.
Now consider the difference in quantiles:
θˆB(y)− θˆC(y) = θˆC
(
γ + c
2n
)
+
a
n
+
cy
2n
= (y − zβ)
γ + c
2n
+
a
n
+
cy
2n
=
a
n
+ y
γ +2c
2n
− zβ
γ + c
2n
,
where we have replaced θˆC by y − zβ , to order
O(n−3/2); Figure 12 shows this difference as the
vertical separation above a data value y. From the
third expression above we see that in the presence of
model curvature γ the Bayesian quantile can achieve
the quality of confidence only if the prior is data de-
pendent or dependent on the level β.
Similarly, we can calculate the horizontal separa-
tion corresponding to a θ value, and obtain
yC(θ)− yB(θ) = θ
γ + c
2n
+
a
n
+
c
2n
(θ+ zβ)
(8)
= θ
γ
2n
+
a
n
+
c
2n
(2θ + zβ).
This gives the quantile difference, the confidence
quantile less the Bayes quantile, as a function of θ;
see Figure 12, and observe the horizontal separation
to the right of a parameter value θ.
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Fig. 13. The actual Proportion with claimed level β = 50%.
A Bayes quantile can not generate true statements
concerning a parameter with the reliability of confi-
dence unless the model curvature is zero, that is, un-
less the model is of the special location form where
Bayes coincides confidence. The Bayes approach can
thus be viewed as having a long history of misdirec-
tion.
Now let θ designate the true value of the param-
eter θ, and suppose we examine the performance of
the Bayesian and frequentist posterior quantiles. In
repetitions the actual proportion of instances where
y < yC(θ) is of course β. The actual proportion of
cases with y < yB(θ) is then
Propn(θ) = β −
{
θ
γ
2n
+
a
n
+
c
2n
(2θ + zβ)
}
φ(zβ),
where for the terms of order O(n−1) it suffices to use
the N(θ,1) distribution for y. The Bayes calculation
claims the level β. The choice a= 0, c= 0 gives a flat
prior in the neighborhood of θ = 0 which is the cen-
tral point of the model curvature. With such a choice
the actual Proportion from the Bayes approach is
deficient by the amount θγφ(zβ)/2n. For a claimed
β = 50% quantile see Figure 13 for the actual Pro-
portion and for a claimed β = 90% or β = 10% see
Figure 14. Thus, the β quantile by Bayes is consis-
tently below the claimed level β for positive values
of θ, and consistently above the claimed level for
negative values of θ.
In summary, even in the scalar parameter context,
an elementary departure from simple linearity can
lead to a performance error for the Bayes calculation
Fig. 14. The actual Proportion with claimed levels β = 90%
and β = 10%.
of asymptotic order O(n−1). And, moreover, it is
impossible by the Bayes method to duplicate the
standard confidence bounds: a stunning revelation!
7. THE PARADIGM
The Bayes proposal makes critical use of the con-
ditional probability formula f(y1|y
0
2) = cf(y1, y
0
2). In
typical applications the formula has variables y1
and y2 in a temporal order: the value of the first y1
is inaccessible and the value of the second y2 is ob-
served with value, say, y02 . Of course, the value of
the first y1 has been realized, say, y
r
1, but is con-
cealed and is unknown. Indeed, the view has been
expressed that the only probabilities possible con-
cerning such an unknown yr1 are the values 0 or 1 and
we don’t know how they would apply to that yr1. We
thus have the situation where there is an unknown
constant yr1, a constant that arose antecedent in
time to the observed value y02 , and we want to make
probability statements concerning that unknown an-
tecedent constant. As part of the temporal order
we also have that the joint density became avail-
able in the order f(y1) for the first variable fol-
lowed by f(y2|y1) for the second; thus, f(y1, y
0
2) =
f(y1)f(y
0
2 |y1).
The conditional probability formula itself is very
much part of the theory and practice of probability
and statistics and is not in question. Of course, limit
operations are needed when the condition y2 = y
0
2
has probability zero leading to a conditional prob-
ability expression with a zero in the denominator,
but this is largely technical.
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A salient concern seemingly centers on how prob-
abilities can reasonably be attached to a constant
that is concealed from view? The clear answer is in
terms of what might have occurred given the same
observational information: the corresponding picture
is of many repetitions from the joint distribution
giving pairs (y1, y2); followed by selection of pairs
that have exact or approximate agreement y2 = y
0
2 ;
and then followed by examining the pattern in the y1
values among the selected pairs. The pattern records
what would have occurred for y1 among cases where
y2 = y
0
2 ; the probabilities arise both from the density
f(y1) and from the density f(y2|y1). Thus, the ini-
tial pattern f(y1) when restricted to instances where
y2 = y
0
2 becomes modified to the pattern f(y1|y
0
2) =
cf(y1, y
0
2) = cf(y1)f(y
0
2|y1).
Bayes (1763) promoted this conditional probabil-
ity formula and its interpretation, for statistical con-
texts that had no preceding distribution for θ and
he did so by introducing the mathematical prior.
He did provide, however, a motivating analogy and
the analogy did have something extra, an objective
and real distribution for the parameter, one with
probabilities that were well defined by translational
invariance. Such a use of analogy in science is nor-
mally viewed as wrong, but the needs for productive
methodology were high at that time.
If pi(θ) is treated as being real and descriptive of
how the value of the parameter arose in the applica-
tion, it would follow that the preceding conditional
probability analysis would give the conditional de-
scription
pi(θ|y0) = cpi(θ)f(y0; θ)
= cpi(θ)L0(θ).
The interpretation for this would be as follows: In
many repetitions from pi(θ), if each θ value was fol-
lowed by a y from the model f(y; θ), and if the in-
stances (θ, y) where y is close to y0 are selected, then
the pattern for the corresponding θ values would
be cpi(θ)L0(θ). In other words, the initial relative
frequency pi(θ) for θ values is modulated by L0(θ)
when we select using y = y0; this gives the modu-
lated frequency pattern cpi(θ)L0(θ). The conditional
probability formula as used in this context is often
referred to as the Bayes formula or Bayes theorem,
but as a probability formula it long predates Bayes
and is generic; for the present extended usage it is
also referred to as the Bayes paradigm (Bernardo
and Smith, 1994).
The Bayes’ example as discussed in Sections 2
and 3 examined a location model f(y − θ) and the
only prior that could represent location invariance
is the constant or flat prior in the location parame-
terization, that is, pi(θ) = c. This of course does not
satisfy the probability axioms, as the total probabil-
ity would be ∞. The step, however, from just a set
of θ values with related model invariance to a distri-
bution for θ has had the large effect of emphasizing
likelihood L0(θ), as defined by Fisher (1935). And
it has also had the effect, perhaps unwarranted, of
suggesting that the mathematical posterior distri-
bution obtained from the paradigm could be treated
as a distribution of real probability. If the parame-
ter to variable relationship is linear, then Section 3
shows that the calculated values have the confidence
(Fisher, 1935; Neyman, 1937) interpretation. But
if the relationship is nonlinear, then the calculated
numbers can seriously fail to have that confidence
property, as determined in Sections 4–6; and indeed
fail to have anything with behavior resembling prob-
ability. The mathematical priors, the invariant pri-
ors and other generalizations are often referred to in
the current Bayesian literature as objective priors,
a term that is strongly misleading.
In other contexts, however, there may be a real
source for the parameter θ, sources with a known
distribution, and thus fully entitled to the term ob-
jective prior; of course, such examples do not need
the Bayes approach, they are immediately analyz-
able by probability calculus. And, thus, to use ob-
jective to also refer to the mathematical priors is
confusing.
In short, the paradigm does not produce proba-
bilities from no probabilities. And if the required
linearity for confidence is only approximate, then
the confidence interpretation can correspondingly be
just approximate. And in other cases even the con-
fidence interpretation can be substantially unavail-
able. Thus, to claim probability when even confi-
dence is not applicable does seem to be fully con-
trary to having acceptable meaning in the language
of the discipline.
8. OPTIMALITY
Optimality is often cited as support for the Bayes
approach: If we have a criterion of interest that pro-
vides an assessment of a statistical procedure, then
optimality under the criterion is available using a pro-
cedure that is optimal under some prior average of
the model. In other words, if you want optimality,
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it suffices to look for a procedure that is optimal for
the prior-average version of the model. Thus, restrict
one’s attention to Bayes solutions and just find an
appropriate prior to work from. It sounds persuasive
and it is important.
Of course, a criterion as mentioned is just a nu-
merical evaluation and optimality under one such
criterion may not give optimality under some other
criterion; so the choice of the criterion can be a ma-
jor concern for the approach. For example, would we
want to use the length of a posterior interval as the
criterion or say the squared length of the interval or
some other evaluation; it makes a difference because
the optimality has to do with an average of values
for the criterion and this can change with change in
the criterion.
The optimality approach can lead to interesting
results but can also lead to strange trade-offs; see,
for example, Cox (1958) and Fraser and McDun-
nough (1980). For if the model splits with known
probabilities into two or several components, then
the optimality can create trade-offs between these;
for example, if data sometimes is high precision and
sometimes low precision and the probabilities for
this are available, then the search for an optimum
mean-length confidence interval at some chosen level
can give longer intervals in the high precision cases
and shorter intervals in the low precision cases as
a trade-off toward optimality and toward intervals
that are shorter on average. It does sound strange
but the substance of this phenomenon is internal to
almost all model-data contexts.
Even with a sensible criterion, however, and with-
out the compound modeling and trade-offs just men-
tioned, there are serious difficulties for the optimal-
ity support for the Bayes approach. Consider further
the example in Section 6 with a location Normal
variable where the variance depends weakly on the
mean: y is Normal{θ,σ2(θ)} with σ2(θ) = 1+γθ2/2n
and where we want a bound θˆβ(y) for the parame-
ter θ with reliability β for the assertion that θ is
larger than θˆβ(y).
From confidence theory we have immediately (4)
that
θˆ(y) = θˆC(y) = y− zβ{1 + γ(y − zβ)
2/4n}
with O(n−3/2) accuracy in moderate deviations.
What is available from the Bayes approach? A prior
pi(θ) = exp{aθ/n1/2 + cθ2/2n} gives the posterior
bound
θˆβ(y) = θˆC(y){1 + c/2n}+
a
n
+
cy
2n
.
The actual Proportion for the β level confidence
bound is exactly β. The actual Proportion, however,
for the Bayes bound as derived (8) is
β −
{
θ
γ
2n
+
a
n
+
c
2n
(2θ+ zβ)
}
φ(zβ);
and there is no choice for the prior, no choice for a
and c, that will make the actual equal to the nominal
unless the model has nonzero curvature γ.
We thus have that a choice of prior to weight the
likelihood function can not produce a β level bound.
But a β level bound is available immediately and
routinely from confidence methods, which does use
more than just the observed likelihood function.
Of course, in the pure location case the Bayes ap-
proach is linear and gives confidence. If there is non-
linearity, then the Bayes procedure can be seriously
inaccurate.
9. DISCUSSION
Bayes (1763) introduced the observed likelihood
function to general statistical usage. He also intro-
duced the confidence distribution when the appli-
cation was to the special case of a location model;
the more general development (Fisher, 1930) came
much later and the present name confidence was
provided by Neyman (1937). Lindley (1958) then
observed that the Bayes derivation and the Fisher
(1930) derivation coincided only for location mod-
els; this prompted continuing discord as to the mer-
its and validity of the two procedures in providing
a probability-type assessment of an unknown pa-
rameter value.
A distribution for a parameter value immediately
makes available a quantile for that parameter, at
any percentage level of interest. This means that
the merits of a procedure for evaluating a parame-
ter can be assessed by examining whether the quan-
tile relates to the parameter in anything like the
asserted rate or level asserted for that quantile. The
examples in Sections 4–6 demonstrate that depar-
ture from linearity in the relation between param-
eter and variable can seriously affect the ability of
likelihood alone to provide reliable quantiles for the
parameter of interest.
There is of course the question as to where the
prior comes from and what is its validity? The prior
could be just a device as with Bayes original pro-
posal, to use the likelihood function directly to pro-
vide inference statements concerning the parameter.
This has been our primary focus and such priors can
reasonably be called default priors.
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And then there is the other extreme where the
prior describes the statistical source of the exper-
imental unit or more directly the parameter value
being considered. We have argued that these priors
should be called objective and then whether to use
them to perform the statistical analysis is a reason-
able question.
Between these two extremes are many variations
such as subjective priors that describe the personal
views of an investigator and elicited priors that rep-
resent some blend of the background views of those
close to a current investigation. Should such views
be kept separate to be examined in parallel with ob-
jective views coming directly from the statistical in-
vestigation itself or should they be blended into the
computational procedure applied to the likelihood
function alone? There would seem to be strong ar-
guments for keeping such information separate from
the analysis of the model with data; any user could
then combine the two as deemed appropriate in any
subsequent usage of the information.
Linearity of parameters and its role in the Bayesian
frequentist divergence is discussed in Fraser, Fraser
and Fraser (2010a). Higher order likelihood meth-
ods for Bayesian and frequentist inference were sur-
veyed in Be´dard, Fraser and Wong (2007), and an
original intent there was to include a comparison of
the Bayesian and frequentist results. This, however,
was not feasible, as the example used there for il-
lustration was of the nice invariant type with the
associated theoretical equality of common Bayesian
and frequentist probabilities; thus, the anomalies
discussed in this paper were not overtly available
there.
10. SUMMARY
A probability formula was used by Bayes (1763)
to combine a mathematical prior with a model plus
data; it gave just a mathematical posterior, with
no consequent objective properties. An analogy pro-
vided by Bayes did have a real and descriptive prior,
but it was not part of the problem actually being ex-
amined.
A familiar Bayes example uses a special model, a
location model; and the resulting intervals have at-
tractive properties, as viewed by many in statistics.
Fisher (1935) and Neyman (1937) defined confi-
dence. And the Bayes intervals in the location model
case are seen to satisfy the confidence derivation,
thus providing an explanation for the attractive prop-
erties.
The only source of variation available to support
a Bayes posterior probability calculation is that pro-
vided by the model, which is what confidence uses.
Lindley (1958) examined the probability formula
argument and the confidence argument and found
that they generated the same result only in the Bayes
location model case; he then judged the confidence
argument to be wrong.
If the model, however, is not location and, thus,
the variable is not linear with respect to the pa-
rameter, then a Bayes interval can produce correct
answers at a rate quite different from that claimed
by the Bayes probability calculation; thus, the Bayes
posterior may be an unreliable presentation, an un-
reliable approximation to confidence, and can thus
be judged as wrong.
The failure to make true assertions with a promised
reliability can be extreme with the Bayes use of
mathematical priors (Stainforth et al., 2007; Hein-
rich, 2006).
The claim of a probability status for a statement
that can fail to be approximate confidence is mis-
representation. In other areas of science such false
claims would be treated seriously.
Using weighted likelihood, however, can be a fruit-
ful way to explore the information available from
just a likelihood function. But the failure to have
even a confidence interpretation deserves more than
just gentle caution.
A personal or a subjective or an elicited prior may
record useful background to be recorded in parallel
with a confidence assessment. But to use them to
do the analysis and just get approximate or biased
confidence seems to overextend the excitement of
exploratory procedures.
APPENDIX
Tilting, Bending and Quantiles
Consider a variable y that has a Normal(θ; 1) dis-
tribution and suppose that its density is subject to
an exponential tilt and bending as described by the
modulating factor exp{ay+ cy2/2}. It follows easily
by completing the square in the exponent that the
new variable, say, y˜, is also normal but with mean
(θ+a)/(1− c) and variance 1/(1− c). In particular,
we can write
y˜ =
θ+ a
1− c
+ (1− c)−1/2z,
where z is standard normal. And if we let zβ be the β
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quantile of the standard normal with β = Φ(zβ),
then the β quantile of y˜ is
y˜β =
θ+ a
1− c
+ (1− c)−1/2zβ.
Thus, with the Normal(θ,1) we have that tilting and
bending just produce a location scale adjustment to
the initial variable.
Now suppose that y = θ + z is Normal(θ; 1) to
third order, and suppose further that its density re-
ceives an exponential tilting and bending described
by the factor exp{ay/n1/2+cy2/2n}. Then from the
preceding we have that the new variable can be ex-
pressed in terms of preceding variables as
y˜ =
θ+ a/n1/2
1− c/n
+ (1− c/n)−1/2z
= θ(1 + c/n) + a/n1/2 + (1 + c/2n)z(9)
= y(1 + c/2n) + a/n1/2 + θc/2n,
where succeeding lines use adjustments that are
O(n−3/2). The second line on the right gives quan-
tiles in terms of the standard normal and the third
line gives quantiles in terms of the initial variable y.
One application for this arises with posterior dis-
tributions. Suppose that θ = y0+ z is Normal(y0,1)
to third order and that its density receives a tilt
and bending described by exp(aθ/n1/2 + cθ2/2n).
We then have from (9) that the modified variable
can be expressed as
θ˜ = y0(1 + c/n) + a/n1/2 + (1 + c/2n)z
(10)
= θ(1 + c/2n) + a/n1/2 + y0c/2n,
to order O(n−3/2).
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